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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ~ 
Plaintiff-ll es po11de 11t, 
vs. Case No. 
( 1078:3 
KENT .M. KIRKMAN, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant appeals his conviction for burglary in 
the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,iVER COURT 
Appellant was charged by information with the crime 
of burglary in the second degree. Jury was had in the 
Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of 
Davis, State of Utah, on September 20, 1966. The jury 
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returned a verdict of guilty as charged, and the Honor-
able Parley E. Norseth, judge, imposed sentence upon 
the appellant of confinement for the indeterminate 
period provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the conviction should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is in agreement with appellant's state-
ment of facts with the addition and clarification of these 
following particulars: Prior to the time when Officer 
Ehlers arrived on the scene, John Dinse and his wife, 
Laola Dinse, had observed the truck which the defend-
ants occupied, pull into the driveway of their business 
establishment directly across the street from the Boun-
tiful City Water Shops (Tr. 52, 25). They then ob-
served the truck back out of the driveway and proceed 
north up the street past the Bountiful City Water 
Shops (Tr. 39, 52). They further observed the truck 
to drive up and down the street two or three times with 
the headlights off (Tr. 53, 30). Laola Dinse next 
observed the truck drive up and over the curb and park 
very near to the Bountiful City Water Shops (Tr. 
53). Laola Dinse made the additional observation 
that the defendants seemed to be hooking something 
with a chain and trying to drag it. (Tr. 32). 
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The facts of appellant's brief correctly state that 
a window leading into the rest room of the Bountiful 
City \Vater Shops was found open. However, it is 
significant that through said rest room, entrance may 
be gained to the main parking area wherein truck No. 
3 owned by the Bountiful City vVater Company was 
parked on the evening of April 5, 1966 (Tr. 63). A 
wrench properly identified in the evidence as that 
belonging in the tool compartment of truck No. 3 was 
found in the front seat of the truck occupied by the 
defendant on the evening of April 5, 1966 (Tr. 39). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF BURGLARY 
IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
Appellant has been convicted of burglary in the 
second degree. The elements of said crime are stated 
in Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-9-3 (1953). The statute, in 
part, provides: 
Every person who, in the nighttime, 
enters an open door, window, or other 
apertureof any house ... or other build-
ing ... with intent to commit larcency or 
any felony, is guilty of burglary in the 
second degree. 
Thus it is clear that the State need put on suffi-
<'ient evidence only to prove these things: That the 
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accused entered a building; that the accused entered 
during the nighttime; that the accused entered with the 
intent to commit a felony. Respondent submits that 
the evidence clearly shows sufficient facts from which 
the jury could reasonably find that all of the elements 
of the crime were present. 
It is clear from the direct evidence in this case 
that appellant and another, not involved in this prose-
cution, drove by the Bountiful City '¥ ater Sheds a 
number of times with their lights off. Apparently 
they were "casing" the building upon which they had 
designs. After a number of times up and down the 
street, they decided that the coast was clear, drove up 
and over the curb, and parked the truck next to a win-
dow in the Bountiful City Water Sheds. The men 
then got out of the truck. There follows a period of 
perhaps ten minutes wherein there is no direct evidence 
as to the activities of the defendant. However, they 
were next observed by both Mrs. Dinse and Officer 
Ehlers to be standing outside of the truck. Also, Officer 
Ehlers observed a wrench belonging to the Bountiful 
City Water Company in the front seat of the truck 
occupied by defendant. This wrench was supposed to 
be not in the seat of defendant's truck, but in the tool 
compartment of the truck owned by the Bountiful 
City Water Company, which truck: was at the time 
inside the building in question. The way to the park-
ing area where the truck was kept was readily ac-
cessible through the open window in the building. 
However, it can be reasonably inf erred that since the 
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defendant and his companion were working on the 
outside gate at the time they were apprehended, that 
they not only wanted to get themselves inside the 
building, which they could do and the jury believed 
they had done via the window access route, but they 
also wanted to get their truck inside the gate and in-
side the building. For this they came well prepared. 
They had bolt cutters, crow bar, and a pry bar in the 
back of the truck. Some of these tools were being used 
at the time they were apprehended or had been used 
immediately preceding their apprenhension in an at-
tempt to open the gate through which their truck could 
be admitted. 
Respondent agrees with appellant that the most 
damaging evidence adduced in this case was the wrench 
belonging to the Bountiful City Water Company and 
found in possession of appellant. This evidence gives 
rise to the strong inference that appellant did, in fact, 
enter the building and would suffice to supply the 
necessary element of entry. As was stated in State v. 
Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 315, 392 P.2d 486, 488 (1964) 
"The jury can find not only the facts shown directly 
by the evidence, but also such additional facts as may 
reasonably be inferred therefrom." Thus, that the 
building was entered would hardly admit of argument. 
It is submitted that the foregoing detailed circum-
stances would also suffice to allow the jury to return 
a finding which would include a determination that 
the defendant intended to commit a felony inside the 
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building. As was said in State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 
2d 363, 365, 359 P.2d 486, 488, ( 1961) : 
It is to be remembered that intent, be-
ing a state of mind, is rarely susceptible 
of direct proof. But it can be inferred 
from conduct and attendant circum-
stances in the light of human behavior 
and experienc~. It is upon that basis that 
authorities uniformly affirm that where 
one breaks and enters into the dwelling of 
another in the nighttime, without the lat-
ter's consent, an inference may be drawn 
that he did so to commit larceny. 
When the facts have been properly presented to 
the jury, great weight is given to the properiety of 
the verdict returned thereon. Thus, when the jury 
finds the fact as such and there is a reasonable basis 
from which they can draw the requisite inferences, 
the decision will stand. State v. '1 1ellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 
324 P.2d 490 (1958); State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 
no, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), cert. den.; Sullivan v. Utah, 
355 U.S. 848 (1957). Thus it is clear that from the 
foregoing circumstances, the jury was entirely within 
its prerogative to find the facts and return a verdict 
of guilty thereon. 
Moreover, that the presence of the wrench iu the 
truck was strongly inferential of what had taken place 
can hardly be disputed. Some jurisdictions will convict 
on that evidence alone; that is, the unexplained pos-
session of stolen property alone is sufficient to co11Yid 
in certain instances. Rueda v. People, 141 Colo. 50"1!, 
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348 P.2d 958 ( 1960) ; Davis v. People, 137 Colo. 113, 
321 P.2d 1103 ( 1958). However, the rule that is adopt-
ed in most of our sister states, and which apparently 
is prevailing in Utah, is that the unexplained pos-
session of articles recently stolen coupled with other 
incriminating circumstances, will be sufficient to sup-
port the jury's verdict of guilty. State v. Washington, 
13 Utah 2d 92, 368 P.2d 709 (1962); People v. Con-
erly, 172 C.A.2d 682, 342 P.2d 305 (1959), cert. 
den., 362 U.S. 924 ( 1959); State v. Andrade, 83 Ariz. 
356, 321 P.2d 1021 ( 1958); State v. Thomas, 121 
Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653 (1952); State v. Deeds, 
126 ~1ont. 38, 243 P.2d 314 (1952); Rogers v. State, 
85 Okla. Crim. 116, l 85 P.2d 927 ( 1947). 
As was said in State v. Thomas, supra, at 641, 244 
P.2d 654: 
vV e recognize the correctness of the de-
fendant's assertion that mere possession 
of recently stolen property, if not coupled 
with other inculpatory or incriminating 
circumstances would not justify submis-
sion ot' the case to the jury and would not 
be sufficieut to support a conviction .... 
Conversely, however,, possession of ar-
ticles rece~1tlv stolen, when coupled with 
circumstance.s inconsistent with inno-
censc .... ma v he sufficient to connect the 
possessor with the offense of burglary and 
justify his conviction of it. 
Respowk11t submits that such is the case with the 
fads as shown by the record herein. There is direct 
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evidence that the defendant had in his possession prop-
erty rightfully belonging to the Bountiful City 'Vater 
Department. There is additional evidence strongly 
tending to show incriminating and inculpatory action 
on the part of the defendant on the night in question. 
In light of these facts clearly established by the rec-
ord, respondent submits that the jury had adequate 
evidence to consider, and its findings of guilty were 
properly supported. 
POINT II. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
WERE PROPER AND ADEQUATE IN THE 
PREMISES SINCE: 
A. THE INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED 
AND GIVEN PROPERLY INCLUDED 
ALL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 
OF THE CRIME. 
B. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL-
ING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION 
WHICH WAS NOT REQUESTED. 
C. THE DOCTRINE OF RECENT POS-
SESSION IS A STATUTORY DOCTRINE 
CONCERNED WITH THE PROSECU-
TION !<-.OR LARCENY, NOT SECOND DE-
GREE BURGLARY. 
A. It is a well settled rule that the instructions 
are to be considered together as a whole, and are not 
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to be taken independently or singularly. In fact, the 
court in this case did so instruct (Tr. 90). With this 
in mind, it is clearly apparent that all of the elements 
of the offense 'vere properly placed before the jury 
via the instructions. Instruction No. I puts forth all 
of the essential elements upon which the jury must 
decide to make a conviction in this case (Tr 84). In-
struction No. 2 is an admonition to the jury that In-
struction No. I is not a statement of facts but is a 
statement of what must be found by the jury in order 
to make a conviction. (Tr. 84). Instruction No. 3 
clearly would tell the jury that they must find suffi-
cient evidence to prove each of the essential allega-
tions incorporated by the first two instructions (Tr. 
85) . And then Instruction No. 4 clearly charges the 
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that all of 
the facts alleged in Instruction No. I did exist in this 
case (Tr. 85). 
Thus, when all of the instructions given in this 
case are taken as a whole, it becomes clearly apparent 
that the jury had before them the charge of finding 
the necessary elements of the crin1e. Further, in return-
ing a verdict of guilty as charged, the jury satisfac-
torily considered each and all of the essential ellega-
tions. 
B. This court has held that unless a party requests 
i11struction on special matters he cannot predicate 
error on the court's failure to charge. State v. Rowley, 
15 Utah 2d 4<, asG P.2d 126 (1963). Defendant did 
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not request an instruction on recent possession at the 
trial. Nor was there any objection made to the failure 
to so instruct at the trial. Appellant admits in his brief 
that the instruction was not requested by defendant 
(Brief of Appellant, page 13). Respondent submits 
that the defendant cannot now complain to this court 
that the failure was prejudicial to him. Yet appellant 
would urge that it is the court's duty to make instruc-
tions that are not requested by either side. By this 
unique argument, defense counsel could in many in-
stances assure themselves of a reversal on appeal 
merely by failing to request a necessary instruction 
hoping that the court might overlook the instruction 
and fail to give it. Respondent submits that this 
method, which would allow the defendant by his own 
doing to set himself up an almost assured reversal on 
appeal, is wholly inconsistent with our system of jus-
tice. It is submitted that our system of justice will 
not tolerate a defendant purposely planting a flaw at 
trial in the hope of gaining a reversal on appeal. 
I-lad defendant, at trial, requested an instruction 
on recent possession, and the court refused to give such 
an instruction, the case would be different. Under the 
facts here, however, the appellant should not be al-
lowed to profit from his own wrong doing. Thus, the 
failure to give such an instruction in no way prejudiced 
appellant. 
C. Appellant urges that the doctrine of recent 
possession is a material element in the crime of seeoud 
10 
degree burglary and cites Utah Code Ann. § 76-33-1 
( 1953), as authority for such statement. The respond-
ent submits that appellant misconstrues this section. 
The section above referenced refers to larceny prose-
cutions. Had appellant been charged with larceny, a 
failure to instruct on all of the statutory elements of 
larceny may indeed have been prejudicial. However, 
we are here concerned with a conviction on the charge 
of second degree burglary. Respondent does not deny 
that the possession of the recently stolen property by 
defendant was considered by the jury. Indeed, strong 
inferences arise from such possession, and these were 
properly considered by the jury under the instructions 
given. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the jury were properly 
presented with the necessary facts to support the con-
viction of burglary in the second degree. It is sub-
mitted that the jury's determination of the facts pre-
sented, and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom 
should not be disturbed on appeal. This court need 
only examine the record to see if there was sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could reasonably con-
clude as they did. Respondent submits that there is 
such sufficient evidence. 
Respondent further submits that the jury were 
properly instructed on the law as it applies to this case. 
Vicwiuo· the instructions as a whole, they are clear, 
/"_) 
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concise, and complete and the jury being properly 
instructed returned a verdict which clearly substan-
tiates that they were satisfied that all of the necessary 
elements of the crime were present. Respondent urges 
that in view of this record and the facts found by the 
jury, this court should affirm the conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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